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Abstract
An increasing share of firms’ borrowing occurs through bond markets. How does
debt structure affect the transmission of monetary policy? We present a high-frequency
framework that combines identified monetary shocks with a cross-sectional firm-level
stock price reaction. An envelope argument shows that, since firms maximize equity
value subject to constraints, stock price reactions reflect how monetary policy affects
constraints. We find that, contrary to standard bank lending channel predictions, bond
financing does not attenuate monetary transmission in the Eurozone: firms with more
bonds are more affected by surprise monetary tightenings relative to other firms. This
is consistent with significant bond-specific frictions that limit the benefits of disinter-
mediation.
Keywords: Monetary policy, debt structure, stock market, banking relationships, cor-
porate bonds JEL codes: E44, E52, G21, G23
∗Preliminary, comments welcome.
1 Introduction
Most macroeconomic aggregates—such as investment, output, or employment—are de-
termined by firm decisions and influenced by monetary policy. Given that changes to
the policy rate directly affect the cost of external financing, it is plausible that firms’ debt
plays an important role. A (multiform) "bank lending channel" is the predominant view
to understanding the financial transmission of monetary policy.1 However, bond financ-
ing has been rising at the expense of bank lending in recent years. Europe is a striking
example of this rapid growth: although its bond markets were historically less developed
than in the U.S., according to the European Commission, the share of market financing
doubled since 2000. How does monetary transmission depend on the bond-bank share?
This is an open and consequential issue—indeed, the stock of bond debt has become a
significant concern for central bankers.2
As long as bonds and loans are not perfect substitutes, how the pass-through of mon-
etary policy changes with debt composition is theoretically unclear. The classical bank
lending channel predicts that a higher bond share attenuates pass-through: bond mar-
kets are often thought to be a largely frictionless "spare tire" that insulate firms from a
tightening of financial constraints. However, bond-specific frictions can alter this conclu-
sion. For instance, market debt is more rigid and harder to renegotiate relative to bank
loans, or "relationship financing" (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Crouzet, 2017) or provide
less screening and monitoring (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2011).
Credible empirical investigations are thus crucial to make progress on this question. Be-
cause monetary policy decisions are endogenous and correlated with many drivers of
firm choices, high-frequency approaches have been remarkably successful in isolating
monetary shocks (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018b). Tracing the impact of those shocks
1Because banks are levered intermediaries issuing liquid deposits to fund illiquid loans, they are po-
tentially affected by monetary policy in specific ways. Classical views stress the role of reserves and cap-
ital, whereas more recent theories emphasize market power (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2017; Wang,
Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018), bank liquidity management (Bianchi and Bigio, 2014; Drechsler, Savov, and
Schnabl, 2018), the composition of bank interest income (Wang, 2018) or interest coverage covenants (Green-
wald, 2019), among others.
2The January 2019 minutes of the FOMC state that "the build-up in overall nonfinancial business debt to
levels close to historical highs relative to GDP was viewed as a factor that could amplify adverse shocks to
the business sector." The President of the Federal Reserve of Dallas recently claimed: "As a central banker,
I am carefully tracking the growth in BBB and less-than-investment-grade debt. In a downturn, some
proportion of BBB bonds may be at risk of being downgraded, creating dislocations."
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on the real economy is nevertheless challenging as firm-level outcomes tend to adjust at
a much lower frequency.
To address those challenges, this paper presents a high-frequency approach that com-
bines identified monetary shocks with cross-sectional firm-level stock price reactions in
the Eurozone. An envelope argument shows that, since firms maximize equity value sub-
ject to constraints, stock price reactions are directly influenced by how monetary policy
affects constraints. We illustrate this idea in a simple framework of debt structure, in-
vestment, and stock price and show that the effect of a higher share of bond financing is
ambiguous. While the (multiform) bank lending channel implies a smaller shift in credit
supply for bond-financed firms, the existence of bond-specific frictions dampens and can
even reverse this effect. Indeed, we find that bond financing does not attenuate monetary
transmission in the data: firms with more bonds are more affected by surprise mone-
tary tightenings relative to other firms. This stands in contrast to standard bank lending
channel predictions and shows that bond-specific frictions are important for monetary
transmission and limit the benefits of disintermediation.
The first part of the paper explains how to interpret stock market reactions to learn
about the effect of monetary policy on firms. We highlight a general envelope argument:
to a first order, since firms maximize equity value subject to constraints, their stock price
reaction is not driven by changes to the firm’s optimal policies. Instead, it consists of the
sum of (i) a "direct" effect and (ii) a "constraint" effect. The direct effect captures the reval-
uation of the present value of future profits keeping the firm’s policies unchanged. Concretely,
it can work through a change in discount rates (equity duration), as well as, beliefs about
the future state of the economy3 or price changes in general equilibrium. The constraint
effect, on the other hand, captures how monetary policy tightens or relaxes financial con-
straints, a force at the heart of recent macro-finance models of monetary transmission.
The main appeal of our approach is that it allows us to learn about this object within
a high-frequency identification framework. More precisely, the constraint effect is the
product of two terms. First, a pass-through term that measures how much a policy sur-
prise mechanically tightens the constraint faced by the firm. Second, the shadow price of
this constraint: the Lagrange multiplier that measures the distortion in a firm’s policies
3See the growing literature on the "information effect" of monetary policy, such as Nakamura and Steins-
son (2018a), Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) or Laarits (2019).
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relative to the unconstrained optimum.
To show that the effect of bond financing on monetary transmission depends on the
magnitude of bond-specific frictions, we apply our envelope decomposition to a few il-
lustrative models. Firms optimally choose debt structure by solving a trade-off between
bank andmarket financing. Moreover, debt structure matters for howmonetary policy af-
fects financial constraints. To emphasize that our point is fairly general, we let the details
vary across models.4 The "direct effect" is equivalent to the unconstrained firms’ stock
price reaction and its magnitude is not directly informative about their real responses, by
a standard envelope argument.5 On the other hand, the "constraint effect" is informative.
When bond-specific frictions are low, the stock price reaction is greatly attenuated by a
higher bond share of firm financing. When these frictions are high, the reduction is lower
and can possibly reverse: constraints tighten relatively more for bond-financed firms.
In the second part of the paper, we apply this approach to a cross-section of pub-
lic firms in the Eurozone and ask whether a larger share of bond financing implies a
lower stock price reaction.6 We construct a panel that combines information on policy an-
nouncements, asset prices, firm balance sheets and financing structure. The baseline anal-
ysis focuses on conventional monetary policy between 2001 and 2007, from the early years
of the Euro to the beginning of the financial crisis. We use the series of high-frequency
monetary shocks constructed by Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa
(2019). These shocks capture the surprise content of central banks’ announcements. They
hence are little affected by general macro-economic information that did not fall on that
specific time window of the day. Daily stock prices are merged with balance sheet infor-
mation as well as comprehensive corporate bond issuance data to measure the reliance of
firms on bond financing.
4Developing a unified quantitative model of debt structure and monetary transmission is nevertheless
an important next step. Crouzet (2019), Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018), Crouzet (2017) or Chang,
Fernández, and Gulan (2017) provide some building blocks.
5To the best of our knowledge, the first trace of this argument in the context of monetary policy can be
found in the Appendix of Ozdagli (2018).
6Our high-frequency identification strategy relies on stock prices adjusting rapidly, and firms maximiz-
ing equity values. Similar to existing work in the United States, such as Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016),
we focus on index constituents of the EURO STOXX sectoral indices to capture the most-liquid stocks and
best-governed firms. Our sample nevertheless captures about 80% of total bonds outstanding in the Euro-
zone. We acknowledge that the frictions at play for smaller firms are potentially different. Complementary
to our approach, work studying low-frequency firm-level response tends to use a broader sample, although
typically still within the Compustat universe (Crouzet, 2019; Ottonello and Winberry, 2018; Cloyne, Fer-
reira, Froemel, and Surico, 2018).
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There are at least two econometric challenges to be addressed in this setting. First,
our high-frequency approach using a narrow window helps to alleviate the concern that
firm reactions are driven by news unrelated to monetary policy. An advantage of using
high-frequency stock price reaction as an outcome variable is that asset prices quickly
adjust to reflect the effect of monetary surprises.7 Second, debt structure is not randomly
assigned, andwe need to rule out omitted variables that drive both debt structure and firm
reactions to monetary policy. We leverage the granularity of our firm-level data to try to
rule out alternative interpretations. To account for changes in discount rates, we control
for equity duration as defined in Gormsen and Lazarus (2019) and Weber (2018), since
bonds are more likely to be fixed-rate and long-term relative to loans. More conventional
channels, such as changes in market beliefs, consumer demand, labor supply, or input
and output price levels, can also matter and, while a direct link to the bond share is less
clear, an indirect link can arise through sector-level differences. We thus include sector-
time fixed effects to isolate the differential impact of more bond financing within firms in
the same sector on the same day. Besides, robustness tests can rule out several widespread
alternative explanations based on existing work. Still, we acknowledge that the lack of
exogenous variation means we cannot completely exclude that unobserved heterogeneity
within sectors accounts for our findings.
We find strong evidence that debt structure matters for the transmission of monetary
policy: firms with more bond debt are relatively more affected by surprise interest rate
changes. Quantitatively, after a 25 basis point increase in interest rates, firms in the bottom
quartile of the bonds over assets distribution have a 60 basis point lower stock return
relative to firms in the top quartile. This finding is hard to square with a (multiform)
bank lending channel. Irrespective of the exact micro-foundation, this type of explanation
would imply that bond-reliant firms are relatively less responsive, the opposite of what
the data suggest. On the other hand, this evidence is consistent with the existence of
intense bond-specific frictions in the Eurozone. Importantly, the effect is equally forceful
during the post-crisis period, when bond financing became much more prevalent. These
findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including the inclusion of
traditional balance sheet covariates that are thought to drive the response to monetary
7In a similar spirit, Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2020) looks at the high-frequency response of credit
spreads in a cross-section of U.S. rated firms.
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policy, such as leverage, default risk, or CAPM betas.
We complement our high-frequency results with some suggestive evidence on credit
substitution and investment. The usual caveat applies: the statistical power to assess the
effect of cleanly identified shocks on real variables several quarters into the future is lim-
ited because many other shocks also affect these variables over longer periods. First, we
find that firms tend to substitute away from loans towards bonds after monetary tighten-
ings. This is in line with an extensive literature linking credit flows to monetary policy.8
However, note that this substitution does not imply that firms are not affected by the
shock. Crouzet (2017) shows that a switch away from bank financing leaves firms ex-
posed to bond-specific frictions that reduce investment through a precautionary motive.
Quantitatively, Crouzet (2017) shows that this "debt substitution channel" can explain up
to a third of the contraction of investment during the Great Recession. We indeed find
a corresponding pattern in our sample: bond-reliant firms tend to contract investment
more after a rate hike relative to other firms.
Finally, we compare our Eurozone findings with the case of the United States. In
the sample of constituents of the S&P 500 index over the same period, we find no dif-
ference across firms with different debt structures once we control for equity duration.
This result is consistent with Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018), who show that
bank-reliant firms’ stock price reactions are larger, but that the difference disappears
when conditioning on whether firms hedge interest rate risk. Crouzet (2019) finds that
a higher bond share reduces the pass-through, although he focuses on a broader sample
and low-frequency outcomes. All those findings imply significantly smaller bond-specific
frictions, if any, in the United States relative to the Eurozone. Several stylized facts and
institutional details support this view. For instance, the prevalence of rating agencies and
public information is drastically lower in the Eurozone: the ECB estimates that in 2004
only 11% of firms with turnover over e50M had an S&P rating in Europe, compared to
92% in the U.S. We also show that rating downgrades have a stronger effect for firms in
the Eurozone. Legal scholars have even argued that the U.S. system is better equipped to
deal with the distress of firms funded by bond debt and that national insolvency laws in
8See, for example, Becker and Ivashina (2014), Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1996), Crouzet (2019),
Lhuissier and Szczerbowicz (2018) or Elliott, Meisenzahl, Peydró, and Turner (2019). Balloch (2018), Grosse-
Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz (2019), Arce, Gimeno, and Mayordomo (2018) and Ertan, Kleymenova,
and Tuijn (2019) study quantitative easing and bond liberalization episodes.
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Europe are often unprepared for the rising importance of bond markets (Ehmke, 2018).
Active policy efforts to mitigate bond market frictions are necessary for firms to benefit
fully from credit substitution.9
The chief implication of our findings is that macroeconomic models would benefit
from featuring heterogeneity in debt structure more prominently. In particular, they need
to account for the mix of bonds and bank loans. Sources of external financing are not
perfect substitutes, and the underlying trade-offs affect the pass-through of macroeco-
nomic shocks. The exact mechanisms at play, as well as the effects of other shocks, such
as unconventional monetary policy, are important areas for future research.
Related literature
This paper builds on an extensive body of work at the intersection of corporate finance
and macroeconomics. First, it relates to the literature on the mix of bonds and bank loans.
Crouzet (2017, 2014), De Fiore and Uhlig (2011, 2015) and Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito,
and Perez-Orive (2018) show that the optimal mix of bonds versus loans varies in the
cross-section of firms and that this fact has implications for real outcomes. Crouzet and
Mehrotra (2017) find that U.S. bond issuers are more sensitive to recessions. We empha-
size the role of bond-specific frictions following classical theoretical (Bolton and Scharf-
stein, 1996; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Gersbach and Uh-
lig, 2007; Bolton and Freixas, 2000) and empirical contributions (Denis and Mihov, 2003;
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990, 1991;
Schwert, 2018b,a).
Our Eurozone findings complement two recent papers on debt structure and mon-
etary transmission in the United States. Crouzet (2019) studies how monetary pass-
through changes as firms become less reliant on intermediated debt. He introduces a
model in which firms choose investment and their debt structure by trading off higher
loan flexibility with the lower cost of bonds and provides low-frequency firm-level evi-
dence consistent with these predictions. Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018) docu-
ment a floating rate channel of monetary policy. Because bank loans have floating rates
mechanically tied to the policy rate, monetary shocks can directly affect the liquidity and
9Indeed, this is the explicit objective of the Expert Group on European Corporate Bond Markets that
started reporting to the European Commission in 2017.
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balance sheet strength of firms through existing loans. They show that firms with more
unhedged loans display a stronger sensitivity of their stock price, cash holdings, inven-
tory, and fixed capital investment to monetary policy.
In terms of its approach, this paper relies on high-frequency identification of mone-
tary policy shocks (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002;
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005a; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Corsetti, Duarte, and
Mann, 2018; Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa, 2019). We build
on existing work tracing the impact of these shocks in the cross-section of firms us-
ing high-frequency changes in stock prices (Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2016; Ozdagli,
2018; Ozdagli and Velikov, 2019; Haitsma, Unalmis, and de Haan, 2016; Weber, 2015;
Ozdagli andWeber, 2017; Chava and Hsu, 2015; Lakdawala andMoreland, 2019; Gürkay-
nak, Karasoy-Can, and Lee, 2019), while Chodorow-Reich (2014) investigates the effect of
unconventional monetary policy on financial institutions. Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi
(2020) studies the response of credit spreads in the cross-section of U.S. bond issuers and
shows that monetary policy has heterogeneous effects on firms, depending on their level
of leverage. There is also an extensive literature showing that monetary policy affects
the risk premium (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018; Kekre and Lenel, 2019; Cieslak,
Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2019; Lucca and Moench, 2015; Laarits, 2019; Gertler and
Karadi, 2015).
We further add to the literature showing thatmonetary policy impacts credit flows and
that firms move towards market financing following a monetary tightening (Becker and
Ivashina, 2014; Lhuissier and Szczerbowicz, 2018; Elliott, Meisenzahl, Peydró, and Turner,
2019; Kashyap, Stein, andWilcox, 1996; Bolton and Freixas, 2006). This credit substitution
is in line with papers on the bank lending channel of monetary policy (Drechsler, Savov,
and Schnabl, 2017; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2012;
Wang, 2018; Greenwald, 2019; Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018). More generally, poli-
cies stimulating bondmarkets can have aggregate effects through the substitution of bank
loans toward bonds (Balloch, 2018; Grosse-Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz, 2019; Arce,
Gimeno, and Mayordomo, 2018; De Santis and Zaghini, 2019).
In terms of its findings, this paper aligns with the growing consensus that heterogene-
ity is key to monetary policy transmission. For instance, Ottonello and Winberry (2018),
Jeenas (2018) and Lakdawala and Moreland (2019) emphasize heterogeneous response
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of firms with different financial positions, while Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico
(2018) stress the role of firm’s age. Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016) and De Fiore,
Teles, and Tristani (2011) present macroeconomic models of monetary policy with a focus
on firms’ external financing. Rodnyansky (2019) investigates how firm heterogeneity to-
gether with intermediate import intensities mediate the monetary transmission process in
unorthodox ways. Lian and Ma (2018) show the different macroeconomic implications of
asset-based versus cash-flow based lending. Auclert (2019), Wong (2019), Kaplan, Moll,
and Violante (2018), Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and Silvia (2017) also highlight the
importance of heterogeneity, with a stronger focus on the household sector.
2 High-Frequency Approach
2.1 Envelope Argument: Information in Stock Price Reaction
This section offers a general illustration of the envelope argument that will guide our
empirical strategy. We argue that stock prices are special. Not only are they available
at high-frequencies to help with identification, but they are also particularly revealing
through their connection to the objective function of firms. As firms maximize equity
value subject to constraints, stock price reactions have a clear interpretation given by the
envelope theorem.
To fix ideas, consider a setting that potentially fits manymacro-financemodels of firms
facing financial constraints. The firm has a vector of characteristics x, and denote the
monetary policy target by rf . The firm chooses its optimal policies y∗ = (I∗, N∗, D∗...) for
path of inputs, employment, debt, etc. These policies are chosen to maximize the present
value of future expected profits E(y, x, rf ) = E
[
Σt
pit(y,x)
(1+rt)t
]
. In addition, the firm is subject
to a numberK of constraintsGk(y, x, rf ) ≥ 0, which potentially depend on the policy rate
rf . In this setting, equity value is the value function:
V = max
y
E(y, x, rf ) s.t. Gk(y, x, rf ) ≥ 0∀k
The stock price reaction to small monetary policy shocks can be computed directly using
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the envelope theorem:
dV
drf
=
∂E(y∗, x, rf )
∂rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+Σkλk
∂Gk(y
∗, x, rf )
∂rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
how MP affects constraints
In particular, the change in optimal policy dy
∗
drf
induced by monetary policy is of a second
order. Instead, the stock price reaction can be decomposed into two terms.
The first term is the direct effect: the revaluation of the objective function induced by
the shock keeping the firm’s policies constant. There are at least three channels that can cre-
ate a direct effect. First, a change in discount rates: equity value is an NPV.10 We call this
the "equity duration" effect, borrowing from the asset pricing literature, where it denotes
the interest-rate sensitivity of the present value of a given cash flow stream. Recent pa-
pers have argued that duration is an influential driver of the cross-section of stock returns
(Gormsen and Lazarus, 2019; Weber, 2018), and we use their measures in our empirical
analysis. A second channel for the direct effect is the change in beliefs: equity value is
an expectation. This captures both the standard channel that a rate hike is contractionary,
as well as an "information effect," in which a rate hike reveals that the central bank is
optimistic about the state of the economy. In both cases, there is a direct effect on the
market beliefs of good versus bad states. Third, changes in prices in general equilibrium.
Changes in nominal input or output prices, as well as a revaluation of nominal debt obli-
gations, can directly affect firms’ profits.
The second term is of particular interest in understanding the monetary transmission
channel. It captures how monetary policy relaxes or tightens the constraints faced by
firms. This channel is central to macro-finance models with financial frictions. Interest-
ingly, our envelope argument shows that stock prices are directly informative about this
channel once we control for equity duration. This is remarkable since an empirical detec-
tion of constraints is very challenging. Note that the idea is quite general—it only relies
on the fact that firms maximize equity value and not on the type of policies or constraints
considered.
Our empirical approach leverages this insight by combining time-series and cross-
10Importantly, a change in the discount rate can occur not only through a change in the risk-free rate but
also in the risk premium (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018; Kekre and Lenel, 2019; Gertler and Karadi,
2015; Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi, 2020).
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sectional high-frequency variation. Monetary policy shocks can be recovered from a
change in market interest rates over short windows around policy announcements (Kut-
tner, 2001; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and
Ragusa, 2019). We focus on the role of debt structure in monetary transmission and ask
whether firms with more bond financing respond differently to monetary policy. The en-
velope argument above suggests that this cross-sectional stock market response uncovers
howmonetary policy affects constraints differentially across firms with varying debt struc-
tures.11 It also makes clear what could potentially confound the analysis: it is essential to
control for direct effects whose magnitudes vary with debt structure.
2.2 Bank vs. Bonds and Monetary Transmission
Before moving to the empirical specification, it is vital to understand the economics be-
hind debt structure and monetary transmission. There are several differences between
bank loans and market financing, which can matter for monetary policy. Theoretically, it
is unclear how the share of bond financing affects pass-through.
The (multiform) bank lending channel: Banks are levered intermediaries that fund
illiquid loans with liquid deposits. It is well known that banks are affected by monetary
policy in specific ways. Classical models emphasize the role of reserves or bank capital.
In contrast, recent views have argued that banks’ market power, loan covenants, banks’
income composition, or the floating rate nature of bank loans are quantitatively important
(Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2017; Wang, Whited, Wu, and Xiao, 2018; Greenwald,
2019; Wang, 2018; Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive, 2018; Gürkaynak, Karasoy-Can,
and Lee, 2019).
Independent of their exact micro-foundations, these theories tend to stress bank-
related frictions. Bond markets are typically modeled as being fairly simple, with a lower
interest rate pass-through relative to loans. The bank lending channel is also often asso-
ciated with the view that bond markets are "spare tires" to which borrowers can turn to
when bank credit retracts. The natural prediction of the bank lending channel is thus that
firms with more bond financing are relatively less affected by monetary policy.
Bond-specific frictions: An equally large body of work emphasizes that relationship
11Cross-sectional estimates can only capture constraints for which debt structure matters. If monetary
policy relaxes constraints uniformly across firms with different debt structures, our estimates will be zero.
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banking and market financing are not perfect substitutes. A central aspect of this differ-
ence is that bonds tend to be widely held by a dispersed base of investors, which makes
them harder to renegotiate (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). This coordination (free-rider)
problem across bond creditors means that market financing is typically perceived to be
less flexible than bank loans. This lower flexibility implies that banks are better able
to help their relationship borrowers to avoid financial distress (Crouzet, 2017; Bolton,
Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2015; Crouzet, 2019). An-
other related friction pertains to information: intermediaries are typically seen as being
more willing to screen and monitor borrowers (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Diamond,
1991; Rajan, 1992; De Fiore and Uhlig, 2011), while market lenders tend to rely on public
information that is often provided by rating agencies. The informational environment
is thus a salient driver of the magnitude of bond-specific frictions. In these models of
optimal debt structure, loans are often viewed as more expensive, for example, because
intermediaries have to incur monitoring costs.12
There is considerable empirical evidence that banks’ flexibility is beneficial to borrow-
ers in case of financial distress. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) document a higher like-
lihood of private (and presumably less costly) restructuring for firms that hold a higher
proportion of bank debt to total debt. Similarly, Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994)
find that firms are less likely to restructure debt out of court if they have a large amount
of publicly held debt. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) provide similar evidence.
Importantly, the value of bank flexibility is not restricted to liquidation and bankruptcy.
Debt renegotiation by banks helps firms weather a period of temporarily low revenue
and can take many forms, such as a maturity extension, and not just a reduction in in-
terest and principal payments (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). This renegotiation outcome is
made possible by the dynamic nature of the relationship between creditors and debtors
and is significantly harder to achieve with dispersed bond creditors (Denis and Mihov,
2003). Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) find that close ties with banks drive firms’
investment behavior and explain their response to liquidity shocks.
Moreover, the ability to renegotiate or to restructure is determined by the legal frame-
work that governs private contractual agreements. Ehmke (2018) outlines one legal fric-
12See Schwert (2018b) for clean evidence that loans are more expensive than bonds, controlling for firm
characteristics and seniority.
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tion in the case of Germany: “[...] the German legal framework for corporate bond debt
restructuring is caught between two stools: the public ordering law was reformed after
the model of the US rescue regime of Chapter 11 while the reform of the bond law fol-
lowed the UK example and opened the door for private players to fashion a contractual
regime for bond debt restructuring themselves; however, only within the legal constraints
set by the German bond law itself.”
Because of these bond-specific frictions, debt structure can affect monetary transmis-
sion in a novel way. A monetary tightening can lead to a higher debt burden or a slow-
down in economic activity, which raises the risk of financial distress for firms, whether
it is through default risk or more frequent outcomes such as a covenant violation or a
rating downgrade. The lack of flexibility of market financing can thus be costly for bond-
dependent firms. If bond-specific frictions are large enough, firms with more bond fi-
nancing will be relatively more affected by monetary policy.
Other differences: Empirically, there are further differences between loan and bond
contracts. A key difference is that bonds and loans tend to have different duration (i.e., a
varying discount rate sensitivity). This distinction arises because corporate bonds tend
to have longer maturities than bank loans, and they are more likely to have fixed interest
rates (Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive, 2018; Gürkaynak, Karasoy-Can, and Lee, 2019).
This is important as it affects borrowers’ exposure to monetary policy: while a rate hike
decreases the present value of debt obligations, this decrease is less pronounced for loans
relative to bonds. Note that these differences are less noticeable in the Eurozone relative
to the United States: European bonds tend to have shorter maturities, and the share of
bank loans with floating rates is significantly smaller.
Because debt is a liability for the firm, this implies that, ceteris paribus, more bonds lead
to a smaller (less negative) stock price reaction—larger debt duration implies a smaller
equity duration. This duration effect is one of the direct effects that we highlighted in
the envelope decomposition above. Duration is a central concept in asset pricing, and
recent works have stressed the role of equity duration to explain the cross-section of stock
returns (Weber, 2018; Gormsen and Lazarus, 2019). In our empirical specification, we,
therefore, use the measures those authors introduce to control for equity duration.
Finally, another distinction is that bonds are less likely to be collateralized relative to
loans, and, in general, they tend to be junior to bank debt. It is well known that mone-
12
tary policy can raise asset values and thus give rise to a collateral channel (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997). Hence both the duration and collateral channel would tend to predict that
bond-financed firms are less affected by monetary policy.
2.3 Illustrative Model
The last section shows that the effects of debt structure and monetary transmission are
complicated. Even though some building blocks can be found in the pioneering contribu-
tions of Crouzet (2017), Crouzet (2019), Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018), Ajello
(2016) or Chang, Fernández, and Gulan (2017), much work remains to be done when
it comes to formulating a comprehensive model for quantitative analysis. Instead, the
goal of this section is to illustrate the role that bond market frictions play in monetary
transmission and apply our envelope decomposition to understanding what the cross-
sectional stock price reaction reveals. To this end, we present a stripped-down model of
financial frictions, optimal debt structure, and monetary policy. We acknowledge that for
the sake of tractability, some modeling choices are particularly stark. We discuss alterna-
tive modeling choices in Section 2.3.3 and in the Appendix.
2.3.1 Setup
Firms jointly choose how much to borrow for investment and their mix of loan and bond
financing. We need to model three ingredients: (i) credit constraints, (ii) the trade-off in
debt structure, and (iii) the effect of monetary policy. The trade-off in debt structure is in
the spirit of the static model of Crouzet (2014), with some simplifications.
Credit constraints: We follow the canonical moral hazard framework of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). Borrowing is constrained because, to preserve entrepreneurs’ incen-
tives, the maximum income that can be pledged to an investor is lower than the total
return of the project. The firm has assets/cash on hand of A and chooses investment
level I , which yields RI in case of success and χRI otherwise, with χ ∈ [0, 1). If the en-
trepreneur behaves well, the project succeeds with probability pH . If they misbehave, it
succeeds with probability pH − ∆p and the entrepreneur receives private benefit B per
unit of investment. For incentive reasons, the maximum pledgeable income in case of
success is thus only (R − B/∆p)I , where B/∆p captures the agency friction that leads to
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inefficient credit rationing. The entrepreneur receives nothing in case of failure. A key
object is the expected pledgeable income per unit of investment:
P = pH(R− B/∆p) + (1− pH)χR
The firm can borrow I − A from lenders with cost of funds ρ. Credit constraints arise
because lenders must break-even on the debt while pledgeable income is limited bymoral
hazard: PI ≥ (I − A)ρ.
Debt structure: The firm jointly choose how much to borrow using loans and bonds.
Denoting the bond share by β ∈ [0, 1], total bonds are β(I−A) and loans are (1−β)(I−A).
We follow Crouzet (2019, 2017) and model the trade-off between intermediated and mar-
ket financing in a simple way. Loans are more flexible than bonds because they are held
by concentrated creditors. The payoff χ in case of failure thus depends on the debt struc-
ture, with ∂χ/∂β < 0: bond financing implies less efficient liquidation or restructuring.13
On the other hand, banks occur an intermediation cost and have thus a higher cost of
funds relative to bonds. Therefore, lenders’ cost of funds ρ depends on the debt structure,
with ∂ρ/∂β < 0. Assume a linear functional form: ρ(β, r) = βr+(1−β)(1+ c)r. The term
c > 0 captures intermediation costs born by banks. It also implies a higher interest-rate
pass-through on bank loans which captures the (multiform) bank lending channel in a
reduced-form way.14 In equilibrium, the firm optimal bond share trades-off a lower cost
of debt with less pledgeable income because of inefficient liquidation.
Monetary policy: Wemodel monetary transmission in a simple reduced-form way. A
higher policy rate r has two effects. First, it increases lenders’ cost of funds ρ, such that,
∂ρ/∂r > 0. In our simple risk-neutral economy, there is no effect on the risk premium,
although that could be relaxed (Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018; Kekre and Lenel,
2019; Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi, 2020). Second, it has a contractionary effect on the real
economy by lowering the probability pH that the project succeeds such that ∂pH/∂r <
13An alternative modeling choice would be to assume that bond investors are less skilled at monitoring,
such that private benefits B increases with the bond share β, in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
De Fiore and Uhlig (2011) or Chang, Fernández, and Gulan (2017). This alternative is very similar in terms
of the economics, as what matters is that more bonds can reduce pledgeable income.
14Figure IA.1 in the Appendix provides suggestive evidence for a difference in pass-through. See Ander-
son and Cesa-Bianchi (2020) for a sharp analysis of bond spreads using detailed microdata. Crouzet (2019)
shows that there can be heterogeneous effects even without this differential pass-through.
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0.15 Essentially, we abstract from explicitly modeling nominal frictions and assume that
monetary policy moves real rates (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a; Hanson and Stein,
2015).
Equilibrium: The firm jointly chooses investment scale I and debt structure β to max-
imize profits subject to its credit constraints, given assets/cash on hands A and the policy
rate r. The analysis of investment follows closely Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Given
constant returns to scale, the credit constraint binds in equilibrium. This fact implies that
investment is proportional to A: I = m(β, r)A, where the multiplier is given by:
m(β, r) :=
1
1− P(β,r)
ρ(β,r)
(1)
The multiplier reflects the firm’s debt capacity and decreases with financial constraints.
When it is large, investment and borrowing are large. It is driven by both pledgeable in-
come and the lenders’ cost of funds. In fact, the ratio P(β,r)
ρ(β,r)
is nothing but the present value
of what can be pledged to creditors. This object is at the heart of many macroeconomic
models with financial frictions, such as the financial accelerator or the collateral channel.
Importantly, the multiplier depends on the debt structure choice: a larger share of bonds
reduces lenders’ cost of funds, but decrease pledgeable income due to larger liquidation
losses. The multiplier also depends on the stance r of monetary policy. This multiplier
will be at the core of empirical predictions of the cross-sectional response to monetary
shocks.
Because the firm promises all its pledgeable income to lenders, it only receives a payoff
in the case of success that preserves its incentives:
V = max
I,β
1
r
pH(r)
B
∆p
I s. t. I = m(β, r)A
The optimal share of bonds β∗ maximizes debt capacity m by trading-off cost of funds ρ
with pleagable income P :
∂m(β∗, r)
∂β
= 0
Stock Price Reaction: The stock price reaction of a small change in the policy rate r is
15"Information shocks" can be easily modeled by assuming the opposite sign instead.
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given by the envelope theorem:
dV
dr
= −
1
r2
pH
B
∆p
I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in discount
rate (direct effect)
+
1
r
p′H(r)
B
∆p
I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in beliefs
(direct effect)
+ λ∗
∂m(β∗, r)
∂r
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
constraint effect
The direct effect corresponds to a revaluation of the firm’s equity following a rate hike,
keeping the firm’s equilibrium policies unchanged. In this simple setting, it has two compo-
nents. First, a change in discount rates that captures "equity duration," as emphasized in
the recent asset pricing literature (Weber, 2018; Gormsen and Lazarus, 2019). Second, a
rate hike alters the market beliefs about the probability of project success. A third poten-
tial direct channel that is absent from this simple model is a change in input or output
prices in general equilibrium. Financial constraints do not drive those effects, and their
magnitude or sign is independent of the firm’s real response.
The constraint effect reflects how monetary policy affects constraints and is the prod-
uct of two terms. The first term is the shadow price of the constraint, given by the La-
grange multiplier λ∗ = 1
r
pH(r)B/∆p. The second term is a pass-through measure that
reflects how monetary policy tightens the constraint. Here, the pass-through is given by
how much the multiplier falls after a rate hike ∂m(β∗, r)/∂r. The constraint tightens for
two reasons: an increase in lenders’ cost of funds, and a fall in pledgeable income.
2.3.2 Cross-sectional effects of debt structure
This simple model provides a framework to understand how debt structure and the
role of bond-specific frictions matter for monetary transmission. In this section, we fo-
cus on the constraint effect. In this setting, properties of the multiplier m(β, r) drive
cross-sectional stock price reactions across firms with different debt structures. Recall
from equation 1 that the multiplier is high when lenders’ cost of fund ρ(β, r) is low and
when pledgeable income P(β, r) is high. While a rate hike tightens constraints for all
firms (i.e., ∂m(β∗, r)/∂r is negative), the magnitude and sign of the cross-sectional esti-
mates depends on the differential effect across firms with different debt structures, i.e.,
∂
∂β
∂m(β∗, r)/∂r. To make the economics behind cross-partial derivatives transparent, as-
sume that the multiplierm is proportional to the difference between pleadgeable income
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P(β, r) and lenders’ cost of funds ρ(β, r). The expressions above for P and ρ imply:
∂m(β, r)
∂r
≈ (R− B/∆p− χ(β)R) p′H(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
↓ pledgeable income
− (β + (1− β)(1 + c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
↑ cost of funds
< 0
Contractionary monetary policy unambiguously tightens financial constraints in this set-
ting. The key question is how this pass-through depends on debt structure:
∂2m(β, r)
∂β∂r
≈ −p′H(r)χ
′(β)R︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect of bond-specific
frictions < 0
+ c︸︷︷︸
bank lending
channel > 0
(2)
This equation summarizes the main message of the paper. The bank lending channel,
irrespective of its exact microfoundations, predicts that bond-dependent firms are less
responsive to monetary shocks (recall that ∂m(β∗, r)/∂r is negative). However, the exis-
tence of bond-specific frictions is a countervailing force. Intuitively, a rate hike increases
the probability of financial distress. This effect is especially pronounced for firms with
more bonds as they face larger liquidation frictions (lower χ). When bond market fric-
tions are present, i.e., when χ′(β) 6= 0 , the cross-sectional prediction of the bank lending
channel becomes weaker. For frictions large enough, the prediction can even reverse:
bond-dependent firms turn out to be relatively more responsive to monetary shocks.
2.3.3 Alternative models
For tractability, the model above makes some stark assumptions. Intuitively, the idea
that bond-specific frictions can attenuate the prediction of the bank lending channel is
rather general. Nevertheless, we present an alternative model that addresses potential
limitations in the Appendix. In particular, renegotiation frictions associated with bond
financing were modeled as lower liquidation values in case of default, following Crouzet
(2014). However, liquidation is somewhat rare in practice, especially for larger firms that
are more likely to issue bonds.
In this alternative model, renegotiation frictions associated with bond financing mat-
ter through a liquidity management channel, even if firms do not default. In the pres-
ence of financial frictions, firms self-insure against temporary cash-flow shocks by hoard-
ing liquid assets (Holmström and Tirole, 1998; Bolton, Chen, and Wang, 2011; Almeida,
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Campello, Cunha, and Weisbach, 2014). Additional investment is thus limited by "liq-
uidity constraints." Interestingly, liquidity constraints depend on debt structure. While
it is often efficient for lenders to agree on a mutually beneficial renegotiation to prevent
financial distress,16 coming to such an agreement is more difficult with dispersed bond
investors relative to concentrated bank lenders. An increase in the policy rate raises debt
burden and tightens liquidity constraints differentially across firms with varying shares
of bond financing. As in the baseline model, bond-specific frictions attenuate the predic-
tions of the bank lending channel and affect the pass-through of monetary policy.
Another advantage of that modeling approach is that it connects naturally with recent
work on the role of corporate liquidity in monetary transmission (Rocheteau, Wright, and
Zhang, 2018; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2018; Ajello, 2016; Altavilla, Burlon, Giannetti, and
Holton, 2019).17 The framework can also be extended to incorporate the effect of mon-
etary policy on the cost of liquid assets, i.e., the liquidity premium (Rocheteau, Wright,
and Zhang, 2018; Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018; Nagel, 2016). Finally, it accounts
for a critical idea in Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018): the characteristics of
outstanding debt matter for monetary transmission beyond the issuance of new debt.18
We nevertheless acknowledge that any model has its shortcomings and that many other
important forces could play a more prominent role, including nominal long-term debt
(Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid, 2016), bond supply (Becker and Ivashina, 2015), default
risk (Ottonello andWinberry, 2018), or the Fed put (Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2017).
We also do not explicitly model the general equilibrium effects on inflation, input prices
or consumer demand, andmuchwork remains to be done to understand how those forces
interact with firms’ debt structures.19
16A renegotiation outcome can take the form of a reduction in debt payments, a maturity extension, or a
dilution to raise new funds.
17Looking beyond the corporate sector, other papers argue that liquidity management in the financial
industry is likewise vital for monetary policy (Bianchi and Bigio, 2014; Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018;
Choi, Eisenbach, and Yorulmazer, 2015). Moreover, Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018) show that household
liquidity constraints determine the impact of monetary policy in a quantitative HANK model.
18This appears to be a salient monetary transmission factor through household debt. For instance, Auclert
(2019), Di Maggio, Kermani, Keys, Piskorski, Ramcharan, Seru, and Yao (2017), Wong (2019), and Garriga,
Kydland, and Šustek (2017) emphasize the role of the stock of long-term fixed-rate mortgages.
19Note that only monetary transmission channels that correlate with debt structure are potential con-
founders in our cross-sectional empirical analysis. Any effect working at the sector level will be absorbed
in sector-time fixed effects.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The main focus of our empirical analysis is on conventional monetary policy in the Eu-
rozone starting in 2001.20 The baseline sample ends in July 2007 with the onset of the
financial crisis, but Section 3.5 extends it to 2018. The period covers a full monetary cycle,
as can be seen in Figure 1.
Construction of monetary shocks: We rely on Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak,
Motto, and Ragusa (2019) that construct a time series of monetary policy shocks using
high-frequency data on overnight interest swaps (OIS swaps). They use the Thomson
Reuters Tick database to calculate changes in the OIS swap rate in a 50 minutes window
around the press release time21. OIS swaps exchange the overnight rate, EONIA22, against
a fixed rate for an agreed period. At the point of contracting, the fixed rate represents the
geometric average of the expected overnight rate over the contract period. In other words,
the fixed rate is the average of the rate at the short end of the yield curve—the primary in-
strument for conventional monetary policy. OIS swaps represent an attractive alternative
to futures on the overnight rate, which are commonly used in the U.S. for high-frequency
identification of monetary policy. Lloyd (2017) finds that the OIS swap rates accurately
measure expectations of future short-term interest rates at a horizon between 1 and 24
months in the Eurozone until 09/2007.23
Section 3.3 shows robustness to using other definitions of monetary shocks that build
on the work of Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018) and Jarocinski and Karadi (2018). The
latter paper classifies the shocks into monetary policy shocks and information shocks
20The Euro was formally introduced on 01/01/1999, which locked all national currencies at a fixed rate
to the Euro. Contemporaneously, the ECB began to set its target rate. The initial period was associated with
considerable operational and policy uncertainty, as reflected by the ECB’s decision to narrow the corridor
of its main refinancing rate. For this reason, we allow for some phasing in.
21Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019) also measure the change in the OIS swap
rate in a tight time window around the press conference. In addition to the shocks in these two non-
overlapping time windows, they provide an aggregate “Monetary Event Window” shock, which is the sum
of the two. Our baseline result is robust to using this aggregated shock. Still, we prefer to use the shock
around the press release as it provides a sharper characterization of conventional monetary policy.
22This is the counterpart to the effective federal funds rate in the United States. Note also that the ECB
target rate and the EONIA have historically tracked each other tightly as the ECB target rate can be under-
stood as the target that is intended to be implemented by open market operations.
23The Eurozone money market underwent significant stress post 09/2007; the baseline sample period
stops in July 2007 such that the identified monetary shocks are unaffected by this.
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based on the covariance with the stock market. Thus, we can exclude "information
shocks" and find that the information effect of monetary policy does not primarily drive
our result.
Table 1 tabulates the summary statistics of the shocks. Our baseline shock is the
change in the OIS 1M swap rate by Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ra-
gusa (2019) in the first row. We tabulate alternatives to this choice for comparison. Ad-
ditionally, we contrast the Eurozone shocks with shocks in the United States taken from
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). The properties of the identified monetary policy shock
in the Eurozone are comparable with those of the better-known shock in the United States.
Many shocks are a few basis points and have a standard deviation of 4 to 5 bps. The sum-
mary statistics suggest that the market largely anticipated monetary policy announce-
ments. On the other hand, there were a significant number of occasions when the an-
nouncement contained unexpected information. Some of these shocks had a magnitude
of ten to twenty basis points, which is large given that rate changes are typically twenty-
five basis points and are concentrated in the first half of the sample.
Firm-level data: We combine different data sources to create a panel of firms during
our period of interest. Balance sheet items come from Thomson Reuters Worldscope and
stock information from Datastream. Information on bond issuance comes from Capital
IQ, which contains more granular information regarding the debt structure of firms than
what is present in Worldscope. Because the coverage of Capital IQ is sparse at the begin-
ning of the sample, we collect data for 2001 manually.
Our high-frequency cross-sectional approach requires a focus on a subset of large
firms. The envelope argument relies on firms maximizing equity values, and on stock
markets accurately reflecting true equity values. For this reason, we constrain our anal-
ysis to the constituents of the highly visible stock market EURO STOXX sectoral indices.
These represent the most liquid stocks and best-governed firms in the Eurozone. Their
inclusion in an index ensures that firms are monitored carefully by analysts and market
participants during the day, ensuring that their stock prices incorporate new information
about monetary policy at high frequencies.24 The second advantage of this procedure is
that it leads to an unbalanced panel that automatically accounts for mergers and acqui-
24For instance, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) focus on the constituents of the S&P 500 for similar
reasons.
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sitions, as well as the rise of new industry leaders or the demise of former incumbents.
Proceeding in this way and excluding financials and utilities, we obtain a sample of 282
distinct firms. The country composition is as expected: all countries are represented, al-
though larger countries like Germany and France capture a bigger share. Importantly,
while this sample only covers a small fraction of public firms, Figure IA.4 shows that it
accounts for about 75% of total corporate bonds outstanding in the Eurozone. Moreover,
the distribution of size and leverage are very similar to U.S. firms included in the S&P 500
stock market index.
Interestingly, there is large heterogeneity in firms’ financing structures even within
those large Eurozone firms. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 and the corre-
sponding histograms in Figure 2. While the average bond debt to asset ratio is relatively
low at 8%25, there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity. About a third of firms have
no bonds outstanding, while others are funding most of their debt using bond markets.
Dividing firms in three even-sized categories by their bond to assets ratio, the first group
has (virtually) no bond debt: the 75th percentile has zero bond debt. The middle cate-
gory has low bond debt: the median bond debt over debt is 32%. The last category has
high bond debt: for the median firm, bonds represent 67% of total debt. Finally, note
that this richness in debt structure implies that bonds do not automatically insulate firms
from changes to the cost of credit—firms in the top tercile of bond debt still have about a
quarter of their debt due within one year, and the average is close to 34%.
3.2 Model Specification and Identification
To understand the role of debt structure on monetary transmission, we run a panel re-
gression of the form:
∆ logPi,t = γ∆MPt × BondSharei,t + Firm FE+ Sector-Time FE+ Controls+ ǫi,t (3)
We use the convention that a positive monetary policy shock ∆MPt > 0 corresponds to a
rise in the policy rate. The coefficient of interest is γ as it captures how the share of bond
25This can be compared with about 18% among members of the S&P 500 and embodies a well-known
fact, sometimes referred as a European "bank bias" (Langfield and Pagano, 2016). The low level persists
today despite some recent upward trends and convergence to the United States. Institutional and historical
reasons have been put forward to explain those differences De Fiore and Uhlig (2011).
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financing affects the response to a monetary policy shock. The classical bank lending
channel implies γ > 0: firms with more bonds are relatively less affected by a rate hike
(recall that the average effect is negative). On the other hand, if bond-specific frictions are
strong enough, the relationship can revert and γ < 0. Our primary measure of the bond
share is the ratio of bonds to assets in the previous year, but we show robustness to using
alternatives. We measure firm reactions as the daily difference in log stock prices. The
panel structure allows for a rich set of fixed effects and controls which act as a defense
against confounding factors.
Concretely, there are at least two identification concerns in this setting. First, there are
macroeconomic variables that affect both debt structure and monetary policy. A high-
frequency approach using a narrow window helps to alleviate the concern that firms’
responses are driven by news unrelated to monetary policy. Importantly, in the spirit of
the pioneering work on high-frequency identification, both our shock and response vari-
able are measured at high-frequency (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 2001; Bernanke and
Kuttner, 2005b; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a). Relative
to using data from firms’ financial statements, an advantage of using stock market re-
sponses is that they incorporate the effects of a shock more quickly and "capitalize" the
impact across all future periods and states of the world. Asset prices reflect all publicly
available information before the monetary policy announcement, and changes in asset
prices reflect the effect of a monetary surprise.
Second, debt structure is not randomly assigned. The decision to access bond or bank
debt is a choice, which leads to a potential identification concern akin to an omitted vari-
able problem. Importantly, a bias arises only from covariates that drive both debt structure
and firm reactions to monetary policy. Indeed, because our approach is cross-sectional,
any channels of monetary policy that are not correlated with debt structure do not affect
our estimates. Unfortunately, we do not have quasi-random variation in debt structure.
In line with the literature on the firm-level effects of monetary policy, we instead do our
best to use the granularity of our data to rule out specific alternatives.26
Our envelope argument shows that a first important confounder is the effect of
26See, for instance, Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018), Ottonello and Winberry (2018), Jeenas
(2018), Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico (2018), Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), or Crouzet (2019).
Ozdagli (2018) is an exception and studies a natural experiment around the Enron scandal to isolate the role
of informational frictions.
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changes in the discount rate, or equity duration. There is a direct correlation with debt
structure: it is well-known that bonds tend to have longer duration relative to loans, as
they are more likely to be fixed-rate and long-term (Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive,
2018; Gürkaynak, Karasoy-Can, and Lee, 2019). A rate hike decreases the present value
of debt obligations, but this decrease is less pronounced for loans relative to bonds. Ev-
erything else equal, this duration should make bond-financed firms less affected by a
monetary contraction, i.e., γ > 0.27 To control for this, we lean on recent developments
in the asset pricing literature that measure equity duration at the firm level Gormsen and
Lazarus (2019) andWeber (2018) and include∆MPt×EquityDurationi,t interactions in all
specifications. We borrow from Gormsen and Lazarus (2019) who show that equity du-
ration is analytically related to the growth rate in earnings per share in a Gordon growth
model and use analyst forecasts for long term growth (LTG) of earnings per share from
IBES.28 In robustness tests, we also account for firm-level CAPM betas.
Leverage, i.e., total debt over assets, is another variable that can correlate with both
debt structure and sensitivity to monetary policy (Ottonello and Winberry, 2018; Ander-
son and Cesa-Bianchi, 2020; Lakdawala and Moreland, 2019; Auer, Bernardini, Cecioni,
et al., 2019). Although more leverage tends to predict a higher share of bonds, it also in-
creases default risk, sensitivity to interest rates, and worsens real frictions through debt
financing (i.e., debt overhang). Therefore, we flexibly include leverage as a control in our
specifications, along with firm fixed-effects that absorb time-invariant firm characteris-
tics. We can, therefore, estimate the differential effect of more bond financing within firms
with similar total debt. More generally, we discuss the role of time-varying observable
firm characteristics, on which firms could select into bond financing, and which have
been found to drive the cross-sectional response to monetary policy in the U.S. Our base-
line regressions include log assets, profitability, cash over assets, tangibility, log market to
book, debt to income, coverage ratio. Section 3.3 discuses further alternatives.
One might likewise be concerned about potential transmission channels of monetary
27Naturally, firms could decide to engage in hedging contracts to remove this duration effect. Ippolito,
Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2018) show that only a fraction of U.S. firms appears to hedge interest rate risk
and that those that do are indeed largely unaffected by monetary policy. Our comparison with the U.S. in
Section 3.6 is in line with these findings.
28For those firm-year observations for which the measure is unavailable, we impute equity duration by
a linear prediction that uses the duration measure of Weber (2018), return on equity and sales growth as
inputs. The results change only marginally by excluding missing observations or by using the imputed
measure for the entire sample.
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policy that affect firms beyond a credit channel, such as consumer demand, labor sup-
ply, price stickiness, or exchange rate movements. While, to the best of our knowledge,
no direct correlation with debt structure has yet been documented for those channels,
an indirect correlation could still arise through sector-level differences. Industries vary in
terms of their bond financing intensity and they can have different exposures to monetary
policy through those channels. We thus include sector-time fixed-effects in all our specifi-
cations. These controls are very tight and they isolate the differential impact of more bond
financing across firms within the same sector, on the same day. In other words, they flex-
ibly account for distinct reactions to any given monetary policy shock across industries,
allowing for the possibility that sector-level responses are time-varying.
3.3 Main Results: The Role of Debt Structure
We find strong evidence that debt structure drives firms’ response to monetary policy
in the Eurozone. Firms with a larger share of bond debt are robustly more affected by
monetary shocks. Table 3, column 2, shows that the bonds-over-assets ratio also signif-
icantly increases firms’ sensitivity to interest rate shocks. The economic significance of
this effect is not trivial: following a 25 basis points increase in interest rates, firms at the
25th percentile of the bonds over assets distribution have a 60 basis points lower stock
return relative to firms at the 75th percentile. Column 3 and 4 confirm this result when
estimated non-parametrically, by using a bond outstanding dummy and terciles of bonds-
over-assets, respectively. Importantly, columns 5 to 8 control for the firm’s total leverage,
either as the continuous ratio of total debt to asset or non-parametric quintile indicators.
In all specifications, the share of debt raised through bonds is strongly significant, for a
given level of indebtedness. Column 7 shows that the effect on bonds-over-assets remains
significant and robust when total leverage is included.29
Collectively, those results point to the special role of bond debt in monetary transmis-
sion. They are hard to square with the classical bank lending channel. Irrespective of the
exact micro-foundation, this type of explanation would imply that bond-reliant firms are
relatively less responsive to monetary tightening, the opposite of what the data indicates.
On the other hand, the evidence is consistent with the existence of intense bond-specific
29This echoes Crouzet and Mehrotra (2017) who show that firms with access to public debt markets
display a higher sensitivity to recessions.
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frictions in the Eurozone.
Robustness: The results are robust to a variety of model alterations. First, we ex-
plore using different definitions of monetary shocks. Table 4 shows that the main result
is robust to the use of three alternative monetary shocks. This includes a longer matu-
rity in the OIS swap to 3M. While the immediate impact of monetary policy is largest
for the short-rate over the next month, we do not want to preclude an effect that lasts
beyond that. Another alternative is the quasi-intraday changes in the OIS 1M swap rate
by Corsetti, Duarte, and Mann (2018). A third alternative is the changes in the OIS 3M
constructed by Jarocinski and Karadi (2018). While this time series is similar to the series
built by Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019), the authors classify
the shocks as monetary policy shocks or information shocks based on the covariance of
the shock with the stock market; the latter is used in Table 7 which excludes information
shocks as a separate robustness test of our results. It turns out that the sign, magnitudes,
and statistical significance are in line with our baseline results.
Another concern might be that the results are confounded by firm risk and that this
risk is correlated with debt structure. Ottonello and Winberry (2018) show that in the
United States safer firms are less responsive tomonetary policy. Tables 5 adds interactions
of the rating category with the monetary policy shocks. The effect of debt structure is
unchanged, and the impact of default risk is aligned with Ottonello and Winberry (2018).
We also check the robustness of our results with respect to a single factor model—the
CAPM. The results are robust to considering only abnormal returns, as shown in Table 6.
3.4 Credit Substitution and Real Effects
We complement our high-frequency results with some suggestive evidence on credit sub-
stitution and investment. A large body of work has documented the link between credit
flows and monetary policy and, in particular, that market financing rises relative to bank
lending after a rate hike (Becker and Ivashina, 2014; Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1996;
Crouzet, 2019; Lhuissier and Szczerbowicz, 2018; Elliott, Meisenzahl, Peydró, and Turner,
2019).30 Consistent with a bank lending channel, such credit substitution shows that firms
adjust their debt structure in response to the banking sector being negatively impacted by
30Grosse-Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz (2019), Arce, Gimeno, and Mayordomo (2018), and Ertan,
Kleymenova, and Tuijn (2019) also document credit substitution following quantitative easing.
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monetary tightening. We find similar effects in our sample.
Because firms’ debt structure is only observable from financial statements, it means
moving away from a pure high-frequency approach. This implies the usual caveat: the
statistical power to assess the effect of cleanly identified shocks on real variables several
quarters in the future is limited because many other shocks also affect these variables
over longer time periods (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018b). We follow existing studies
and aggregate the monetary policy shocks to a quarterly frequency (Ottonello and Win-
berry, 2018; Corsetti, Duarte, andMann, 2018; Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico, 2018;
Crouzet, 2019). Keeping the regression model close to our high-frequency approach, we
estimate local projections following Jordà (2005) for horizons h ∈ {1, . . . , 8}:
∆yi,t+h,t = αi + γs(i),t + β
h
ShockMPShockt × TercileBondLevi,t−1 + δXi,t−1 + ui,t+h,t (4)
where ∆yi,t+h,t is the difference over h quarters of the firm specific outcome vari-
able, αi is a firm fixed effect, γs(i),t is a sector-times-date fixed effect and MPShockt ×
TercileBondLevi,t−1 is the monetary policy shock in time t interacted with the tercile of
bond leverage at the end of the previous fiscal year. Xi,t−1 contains firm specific con-
trol variables, such as, log assets, cash over assets, ebitda over assets, property plant and
equipment over assets, debt-to-income and interest coverage ratio, as well, as two lags of
asset growth to proxy for investment opportunities.
Bond issues for firms are observed at a higher frequency. In this case we aggregate the
data at a monthly frequency and estimate following model:
yi,t+h,t = αi + γq(t) + β
h
ShockMPShockt + ui,t+h,t (5)
where yt+h,t is a dummy that equals one if a bond has been issued after h months, αi is a
firm fixed effect and γq(t) is a time (in quarters) fixed effect.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that firms tend to issue more bonds after monetary tight-
ening. Statistical power is limited by design, and estimated confidence bands are wide.
Economically, credit substitution dampens the effect of the shock by curbing the drop in
credit supply faced by firms. However, this substitution does not imply that firms are
entirely unaffected by the shock. As long as bonds and loans are not perfect substitutes,
there can be real effects even if total credit is stable. Crouzet (2017) shows the impor-
26
tance of such a "debt substitution channel," whereby a switch away from bank financing
exposes firms to bond-specific frictions and reduces investment through a precautionary
motive. Quantitatively, this channel can explain up to a third the contraction of invest-
ment during the Great Recession.
We indeed find a corresponding pattern in our sample: bond-reliant firms tend to
contract investment more after a rate hike relative to other firms. To see this, we estimate
local projections as in equation 4 with the difference of log quarterly net property, plant,
and equipment as the outcome variable, and add an interaction with the firm’s bond to
assets tercile. Panel (b) of Figure 4 displays the differential effect by moving from one
tercile to the next on investment. In response to a contractionary monetary policy shock,
net fixed assets contract relatively more for firms with more bond debt. However, the
statistical power is low, and differences are at best marginally significant. Nevertheless,
the point estimates are not small. One year out, a firm in the third tercile of the bonds to
assets distribution experiences an about 8 ppt reduction in investment relative to a firm in
the first tercile for a shock equivalent to one standard deviation. We take these findings as
suggestive evidence consistent with bonds and loans not being perfect substitutes. Firms
do not necessarily reap the full benefits of credit substitution in the presence of bond-
specific frictions.
3.5 Post-crisis Results
While our baseline sample stops in July 2007, at the onset of the financial crisis, in this
section, we show that our main results hold in a more recent period spanning the begin-
ning of 2013 to the end of 2018. As the sovereign debt crisis followed the financial crisis
in Europe, the start of the recovery period is somewhat arbitrary, and we use 2013 as
sovereign bond spreads had started to normalize around that time. We apply the same
selection criterion for our firm panel based on inclusion in the EURO STOXX index. To
ease comparability with the main analysis, we focus on shocks to the short-end of the
yield curve, that is, changes in the OIS 1M rate.31
Table 8 shows that bond-financed firms are more affected by monetary tightening in
31In principle, shocks related to QE and longer-term rate could also be insightful, although the transmis-
sion channel might potentially be different. The shock series in the sample from 2013 to the end of 2018
has a smaller standard deviation as compared to the sample between 2001 and July 2007. It is, however,
comparable to a subsample of the latter; such as, between 2004 and July 2007.
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this more recent sample as well. If anything, the effect of debt structure is stronger. It is
important that the effect has not attenuated in recent years, although the share of bond
financing has grown massively post-crisis. It appears that the rise of bond financing was
not accompanied by a reduction in bond market frictions, which could be a concern for
Eurozone policymakers—a point we come back to in Section 3.7.
3.6 Comparison with the United States
In the context of external validity, this section draws a comparison with the United States.
Existing work has shown somewhat different results. Crouzet (2019) finds that a higher
bond share reduces monetary pass-through on investment. Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-
Orive (2018) documents a floating-rate channel of monetary policy. Bank-reliant firms’
stock price and investment responses are larger, and that difference appears to depend on
whether firms hedge their interest rate risk, and how financially constrained they are. All
of those findings imply significantly smaller bond-specific frictions, if any, in the United
States relative to the Eurozone (De Fiore and Uhlig, 2011).
3.7 Discussion and Implications
We have provided some evidence consistent with bond-specific frictions affecting the
pass-through of monetary policy in the Eurozone. In this section, we offer some stylized
facts and institutional details in line with the existence of such frictions. First, the infor-
mational environment is radically different from the United States. While rating agencies
are critical to the dissemination of information across dispersed bond creditors, the ECB
estimates that in 2004 only 11% of firms with turnover over e50M had an S&P rating in
Europe, compared to 92% in the U.S. The sparseness of public information makes it diffi-
cult for a firm to access capital markets in bad times, which plausibly makes banking re-
lationships more valuable in Europe. Second, we also show that rating downgrades have
a stronger effect on Eurozone firms. Figure 5 presents the average stock market response
to being downgraded from investment grade (BBB- and above) to speculative-grade (BB+
and below) across the two regions. The raw data reveals that the difference is large and
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significant: about five percentage points lower in Europe relative to the United States.32
Legal scholars have also argued that the U.S. system is better equipped to deal with the
distress of firms funded by bond debt, and that national insolvency laws in Europe are
often not prepared for the rising importance of bond debt (Ehmke, 2018):
A change in the body of creditors’ structure leads to new challenges, which
put the law for restructuring and insolvency law to the test. Particularly where
the public ordering restructuring and insolvency law is designed for a concen-
trated lending structure, the question as to whether the law provides the suit-
able framework to deal with the problems associated with a cloudy body of
creditors becomes pressing. [. . .] A law which produces an efficient outcome
in times of pre-dominant relationship-lending does not necessarily promote
successful bond restructurings.
A key implication is that mitigating bond-specific frictions are necessary for firms to
benefit fully from disintermediation. While bond issuance has been rising fast, thanks in
no small part to expansionarymonetary policy, there is little evidence that the functioning
of bond markets has improved at nearly the same speed. This situation creates a genuine
concern for Eurozone policymakers, and active efforts to mitigate bond market frictions
seem in order. Indeed, this is the explicit objective of the Expert Group on European
Corporate Bond Markets that started reporting to the European Commission in 2017. Im-
proving Eurozone corporate bond markets is a crucial component for a successful Capital
Markets Union going forward.33
4 Conclusion
The share of firm financing that comes from bond markets has been rising globally
throughout the past decade. What does that entail for how firm heterogeneity mediates
the monetary transmission process? This paper develops a high-frequency framework to
32There is also some concern of secondary market liquidity: evidence suggests that transactions cost
indicators exhibit noticeable upward trends since 2014 and those costs have not subsequently decreased.
See the EU Commission report on "Drivers of Corporate Bond Market Liquidity in the European Union":
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/171120-corporate-bonds-study_en.pdf
33For more details, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/171120-corporate-bonds-report_en.
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shed light on this question. Contrary to the predictions of the classical bank lending chan-
nel, Eurozone firms with more bonds are disproportionately affected by monetary policy.
This evidence is consistent with significant bond-specific frictions in the Eurozone, rela-
tive to the United States. Alleviating bond market frictions is vital to allowing maximal
firm benefits from disintermediation.
The overall macroeconomic implications of firms’ debt composition are still insuffi-
ciently understood. This paper provides evidence that sources of external financing are
not perfect substitutes, and the underlying trade-offs affect the pass-through of mone-
tary policy. Existing debt structure is driven by past financing patterns, which are, in
turn, driven by previous policies, suggesting a path-dependence. After quantitative eas-
ing and extensive periods of low long-term interest rates, a large share of economy now
borrows from the bond market, a trend that influences conventional interest rate policy
transmission going forward.
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Figure 1 – Debt Yields across Monetary Cycle
Note: Eurozone: ECB target rate from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb _in-
terest_rates/html/index.en.html); average loan rate in the Eurozone from the ECB statistical data warehouse:
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=124.MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.J.R.1.2240.EUR.N; and yields to
maturity for bond portfolios with remaining maturity of 5yr and BBB and AA rating from Bloomberg: BFV 5yr
EUR Eurozone Industrial BBB Bond Yield and BFV 5yr EUR Eurozone Industrial AA Bond Yield.
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Note: Eurozone: The sample is an unbalanced panel of the European firms that are constituents of the EURO STOXX
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sectoral indices between 2001 and 2007, excluding financials and utilities. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope
and bond debt from Capital IQ.
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Figure 4 – Local Projection Bond Issuance and Net PPE
Notes: The panels show estimates from a local projection following Jordà (2005). Panel (a) uses monthly
times series data for which following baseline model is estimated yi,t+h,t = αi+ γq(t)+ βhShockMPShockt+
ΓXt + ut+h,t; where yt+h,t is a dummy that equals one if a bond has been issued after h months. Bond
issuances data comes from Bloomberg. Panel (b) uses panel-data on the firm-time level. We follow the
extension of the local projection method by Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) and estimate following model:
∆yi,t+h,t = αi + γs(i),t + β
h
ShockMPShockt × TercileBondLevi,t−1 + δXi,t−1 + ui,t+h,t; where ∆yi,t+h,t is
the difference over h quarters of the firm specific outcome variable, αi is a firm fixed effect, γs(i),t is a
sector-times-date fixed effect and MPShockt × TercileBondLevi,t−1 is the monetary policy shock in time
t interacted with the tercile of bond leverage at the end of the previous fiscal year. Xi,t−1 contains firm
specific control variables. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and date level. The dashed lines
indicate the 90% confidence interval for the parameter estimates.
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Figure 5 – Rating Downgrade
Note: Sample encompasses all entity ratings from the S&P rating panel available on WRDS. Rating downgrade is
defined as downgrade from investment grade (BBB- and above) to speculative grade (BB+ and below). Stock price
data is obtained from Datastream. Panel (a) plots average raw returns with respect to the event date for the Eurozone
and the US separately. Panel (b) plots the coefficients {δt}
5
t=−5 of the following model (lnPit − lnPi0) ∗ 100 =∑5
s=−5 γs × Is=t +
∑5
s=−5 δs × Is=t × IEuropei + ǫit, where t denotes event time and I is the indicator function.
Bars indicate the α = 0.9 confidence intervals.
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N Mean SD Min Max
∆ OIS1M 91 0.076 4.80 -35.00 8.65
∆ OIS3M 91 -0.119 4.01 -30.00 5.50
∆ OIS1M Corsettietal 91 -0.046 5.53 -39.25 15.00
∆ OIS3M JK 91 -0.003 4.33 -30.50 9.50
∆ FFR 53 -0.065 4.67 -20.00 12.50
Table 1 – Summary Statistics Shocks
Note: Summary statistics for shocks in the sample period January 2001-July 2007 from Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkay-
nak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019) (∆ OIS1M, ∆ OIS3M); Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) (∆ OIS3M JK) and Corsetti,
Duarte, and Mann (2018) (∆ OIS1M Corsettietal) and in the United States from Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a)
(∆FFR).
43
mean p25 p50 p75 count
No bond debt
Assets (in bn) 15.183 2.544 5.300 12.203 5,413
Cash over assets 0.051 0.020 0.035 0.060 5,413
Earnings over assets 0.145 0.102 0.137 0.187 5,413
Fixed assets over assets 0.260 0.108 0.228 0.381 5,413
Equity duration proxy 11.368 8.220 10.520 13.423 5,413
Market-to-Book 3.419 1.539 2.391 3.913 5,413
Debt over earnings 1.634 0.623 1.822 2.769 5,413
Earnings over interest expenses 21.228 5.617 10.074 18.308 5,413
Debt over assets 0.236 0.128 0.218 0.334 5,413
Debt due within year over debt 0.407 0.190 0.350 0.592 5,413
Bond debt over assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5,413
Bond debt over debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5,413
Low bond debt
Assets (in bn) 22.048 3.788 9.336 21.791 3,136
Cash over assets 0.056 0.023 0.041 0.075 3,136
Earnings over assets 0.129 0.078 0.126 0.181 3,136
Fixed assets over assets 0.264 0.112 0.238 0.392 3,136
Equity duration proxy 10.002 5.690 9.150 13.540 3,136
Market-to-Book 2.618 1.338 2.029 3.046 3,136
Debt over earnings 2.878 1.113 1.862 2.817 3,136
Earnings over interest expenses 17.732 6.045 9.894 15.256 3,136
Debt over assets 0.226 0.139 0.207 0.303 3,136
Debt due within year over debt 0.333 0.165 0.309 0.473 3,136
Bond debt over assets 0.062 0.025 0.061 0.098 3,136
Bond debt over debt 0.334 0.143 0.320 0.477 3,136
High bond debt
Assets (in bn) 33.409 4.494 13.819 37.178 3,461
Cash over assets 0.061 0.023 0.040 0.075 3,461
Earnings over assets 0.109 0.084 0.117 0.153 3,461
Fixed assets over assets 0.276 0.133 0.275 0.390 3,461
Equity duration proxy 10.003 5.600 8.950 13.000 3,461
Market-to-Book 2.555 1.325 2.044 3.141 3,461
Debt over earnings 3.232 1.871 2.684 3.966 3,461
Earnings over interest expenses 9.254 4.485 7.222 11.357 3,461
Debt over assets 0.347 0.252 0.335 0.424 3,461
Debt due within year over debt 0.242 0.130 0.218 0.337 3,461
Bond debt over assets 0.219 0.150 0.202 0.258 3,461
Bond debt over debt 0.642 0.502 0.674 0.790 3,461
Total
Assets (in bn) 22.228 3.142 8.175 19.982 12,010
Cash over assets 0.055 0.021 0.038 0.068 12,010
Earnings over assets 0.130 0.090 0.127 0.174 12,010
Fixed assets over assets 0.265 0.113 0.244 0.387 12,010
Equity duration proxy 10.618 6.830 9.906 13.230 12,010
Market-to-Book 2.961 1.387 2.219 3.398 12,010
Debt over earnings 2.419 1.112 2.011 3.189 12,010
Earnings over interest expenses 16.864 5.277 8.783 14.518 12,010
Debt over assets 0.265 0.163 0.254 0.357 12,010
Debt due within year over debt 0.340 0.156 0.284 0.470 12,010
Bond debt over assets 0.079 0.000 0.016 0.134 12,010
Bond debt over debt 0.272 0.000 0.080 0.552 12,010
Table 2 – Eurozone Firms Balance Sheet Summary Statistics
Note: The table presents summary statistics for an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 91 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. The subsamples "No bond debt", "Low bond debt" and "High bond debt" to corresponds to
the terciles of the bonds-over-assets ratio, recalculated every year. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond
issuance comes from Capital IQ, and stock market information comes from Datastream.
44
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ OIS1M × Debt over assets 0.116 1.103 1.391 2.192
(3.964) (4.342) (3.733) (4.394)
Debt over assets 33.16 34.97 37.62 42.64
(38.07) (37.67) (36.83) (40.07)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over assets -18.49∗∗∗ -19.71∗∗∗ -21.61∗∗∗
(4.936) (5.169) (6.198)
Bond debt over assets -8.986 -19.52 -15.80
(26.86) (29.02) (28.49)
∆ OIS1M × Bond Issued -2.714∗∗
(1.049)
Bond Issued -12.64∗∗
(4.952)
∆ OIS1M × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.513∗∗∗
(0.545)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.108
(2.792)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over debt -5.723∗∗
(2.820)
Bond debt over debt -5.130
(7.948)
∆ OIS1M × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.735∗∗
(0.729)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -4.612∗
(2.768)
R2 0.380 0.380 0.381 0.380 0.380 0.381 0.381 0.381
Duration control X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X X
Sector × Date FE X X X X X X X X
Lev. Quintile Interaction X
Observations 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635
Table 3 – Eurozone Debt Structure and Monetary Policy Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 3 using different measures of bond debt as interacted variable X . The dependent variable is
daily stock return, and MP Shock are taken from Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the
European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 91 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date-times-sector fixed effects, and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets,
cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes
from Worldscope, bond debt from Capital IQ and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level.
*,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over assets -18.49∗∗∗
(4.936)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over debt -5.723∗∗
(2.820)
∆ OIS1M × Debt over assets 1.103
(4.342)
∆ OIS3M × Bond debt over assets -24.72∗∗∗
(4.193)
∆ OIS3M × Bond debt over debt -6.451∗∗∗
(2.150)
∆ OIS3M × Debt over assets 1.502
(4.182)
∆ OIS1M Corsettietal × Bond debt over assets -19.85∗∗∗
(2.526)
∆ OIS1M Corsettietal × Bond debt over debt -6.120∗∗∗
(2.211)
∆ OIS1M Corsettietal × Debt over assets 0.143
(3.734)
∆ OIS3M JK × Bond debt over assets -19.67∗∗
(8.185)
∆ OIS3M JK × Bond debt over debt -4.536∗
(2.576)
∆ OIS3M JK × Debt over assets -0.596
(4.749)
R2 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.381 0.381 0.380 0.380
Shock
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X X
Sector × Date FE X X X X X X X X
Observations 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635 11635
Table 4 – Eurozone Other MP Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 3 using different measures of bond debt as interacted variableX , using alternative measures of
monetary policy shock. Dates include 91 ECB announcements days between 2001 and 2007. The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are from
Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019) (∆ OIS1M, ∆ OIS3M); Jarocinski and Karadi (2018) (∆ OIS3M JK) and Corsetti, Duarte, and
Mann (2018) (∆ OIS1M Corsettietal). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone
indices, excluding financials and utilities. Controls include firm fixed effects, date fixed effects, sector-times-monetary shocks interactions and time varying firm
controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets,
log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond debt from Capital IQ and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors
are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Yield 18.23 18.62 20.01 20.22
(12.85) (12.73) (12.95) (13.05)
IG below AA 11.30 11.38 11.43 11.57
(9.110) (9.077) (9.150) (9.113)
IG AA and above 11.22 10.86 11.28 11.53
(12.56) (12.53) (12.26) (12.37)
High Yield ×∆ OIS1M 9.452∗ 10.32∗ 10.37∗ 10.55∗
(5.316) (5.717) (5.796) (5.363)
IG below AA ×∆ OIS1M -1.639∗ -1.173 -1.566 -1.636
(0.970) (1.042) (1.416) (1.277)
IG AA and above ×∆ OIS1M -3.570∗∗ -3.500∗∗ -3.634∗∗ -3.582∗∗
(1.510) (1.544) (1.742) (1.698)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over assets -19.52∗∗∗ -21.33∗∗∗
(5.977) (6.040)
Bond debt over assets -10.31 -21.65
(26.62) (28.89)
∆ OIS1M × Debt over assets 4.254 3.203
(5.077) (5.269)
Debt over assets 44.45 36.12
(40.54) (38.48)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over debt -6.446∗∗
(3.068)
Bond debt over debt -6.094
(8.125)
R2 0.381 0.381 0.381 0.381
Duration control X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm controls X X X X
Sector × Date FE X X X X
Observations 11635 11635 11635 11635
Table 5 – Eurozone Rating Categories and MP Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 3 using different measures of bond debt as in-
teracted variable X , adding interactions with rating categories (Unrated is the excluded category). The dependent
variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are taken from Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa
(2019). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Super-
sector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 91 ECB announcements days between 2001
and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date-times-sector fixed effects, and time varying firm controls (all lagged
to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest ex-
penses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes fromWorldscope, bond debt from Capital
IQ and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date
level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ OIS1M × Debt over assets -1.973 -1.344 -1.053 -0.534
(2.862) (3.739) (3.065) (4.452)
Debt over assets 25.98 26.94 30.53 32.54
(38.69) (38.36) (37.84) (39.84)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over assets -13.71∗∗ -13.43∗∗
(6.405) (6.386)
Bond debt over assets -5.375 -13.31
(29.48) (30.69)
∆ OIS1M × Bond Issued -1.840∗∗
(0.859)
Bond Issued -13.20∗∗
(5.572)
∆ OIS1M × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.078∗∗
(0.453)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -3.594
(3.060)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over debt -3.613
(2.201)
Bond debt over debt -2.191
(8.203)
∆ OIS1M × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.191∗∗
(0.565)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -4.740
(2.853)
R2 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X
Sector × Date FE X X X X X X X
Lev. Quintile Interaction
Observations 11544 11544 11544 11544 11544 11544 11544
Table 6 – Eurozone - Abnormal Returns
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 3 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X . The dependent variable is abnormal daily stock return with respect to the CAPM where the market
beta is estimated with a one year rolling window. The MP Shock are taken from Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak,
Motto, and Ragusa (2019). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 91 ECB announcements days
between 2001 and 2007. Controls include firm fixed effects, date-times-sector fixed effects, and time varying firm con-
trols (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over
interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond debt
from Capital IQ and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the
firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ OIS3M JK × Bond debt over assets -18.92∗ -22.27∗∗∗
(9.427) (6.948)
Bond debt over assets -40.27 -63.37
(43.13) (51.25)
∆ OIS3M JK × Tercile of bond debt over assets -1.240
(0.771)
Tercile of bond debt over assets 1.367
(5.023)
∆ OIS3M JK × Bond debt over debt -4.997∗∗
(2.442)
Bond debt over debt -7.723
(14.11)
∆ OIS3M JK × Debt over assets 4.609 4.840 6.231
(5.468) (5.449) (5.638)
Debt over assets 86.21 87.55 111.9∗
(59.37) (58.70) (60.16)
∆ OIS3M JK × Tercile of bond debt over debt -1.608∗∗
(0.643)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -3.350
(4.482)
R2 0.402 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.409
Duration control X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X
Sector × Date FE X X X X X
Observations 6735 6560 6560 6560 6560
Table 7 – Eurozone Debt Structure - No Information Shocks
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 3 using different measures of bond debt as inter-
acted variable X . The dependent variable is daily stock return, and MP Shock are taken from Jarocinski and Karadi
(2018), including the classification of the shock into monetary policy and information shock. This specification ex-
cludes shock that are classified as information shock; this reduces the number of ECB announcement dates to 51
between 2001 and 2007. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO
STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Controls include firm fixed effects, date-
times-sector fixed effects, and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets, cash over assets,
earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book.
Balance sheet data comes from Worldscope, bond debt from Capital IQ and stock market information comes from
Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level. *,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1,
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ OIS1M × Debt over assets -24.46 -18.65 -22.02 10.85
(19.01) (19.35) (19.15) (25.38)
Debt over assets 134.8∗∗ 126.6∗∗ 128.3∗∗ 160.9∗∗
(57.02) (55.84) (56.33) (67.11)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over assets -55.36∗∗∗ -64.35∗∗∗ -41.63∗∗∗
(13.01) (18.04) (14.46)
Bond debt over assets 9.109 -66.43 -21.72
(45.84) (55.38) (51.45)
∆ OIS1M × Bond Issued -14.29∗∗
(5.656)
Bond Issued -5.454
(10.05)
∆ OIS1M × Tercile of bond debt over assets -9.569∗∗∗
(1.652)
Tercile of bond debt over assets -0.252
(5.000)
∆ OIS1M × Bond debt over debt -12.45∗∗
(4.944)
Bond debt over debt -22.91
(17.05)
∆ OIS1M × Tercile of bond debt over debt -3.630
(2.232)
Tercile of bond debt over debt -6.182
(5.818)
R2 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421
Duration control X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X X
Firm controls X X X X X X X X
Sector × Date FE X X X X X X X X
Lev. Quintile Interaction X
Observations 8668 8668 8668 8668 8668 8668 8668 8668
Table 8 – Eurozone Post Crisis
Note: This table presents regression results for estimating Equation 3 using different measures of bond debt as interacted variable X . The dependent variable is
daily stock return, and MP Shock are taken from Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019). The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the
European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. Dates include 56 ECB announcements days
between 2013 and 2018. Controls include firm fixed effects, date-times-sector fixed effects, and time varying firm controls (all lagged to preceding year): log assets,
cash over assets, earnings over assets, debt over earnings, earnings over interest expenses, fixed assets over assets, log market-to-book. Balance sheet data comes
from Worldscope, bond debt from Capital IQ and stock market information comes from Datastream. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and date level.
*,**, *** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively.
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Figure IA.1 – Loan rates vs. AA bond yields
Notes: The panel shows estimates from a local projection following Jordà (2005). It uses monthly times
series data for which following baseline model is estimated∆yt+h,t = α+βhShockMPShockt+ΓXt+ut+h,t;
where ∆yt+h,t denotes the difference over h months, α is a constant, and Xt contains multiple lags of the
dependent variable. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval for the parameter estimates with
Newey-West standard errors to account for overlapping observations. Data on bank rate and yield for a
broad bond index comes from ECB and Bloomberg, respectively.
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Figure IA.2 – Sample Description
Notes: The figure displays the raw counts of distinct firms in the sample by year and by country. The
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector
Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities.
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Figure IA.3 – Sample Capital Structure
Notes: The figure shows the time series of equal-weighted sample averages of debt over assets, bond debt
over assets, and bond debt over total debt. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of the European
firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eurozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. The
bond debt comes from Capital IQ and balance sheet data fromWorldscope.
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Figure IA.4 – Sample Coverage Debt Securities
Notes: The figure shows the aggregate debt securities outstanding for the sample and the BIS account for
short and long-term debt securities in the Euroarea. All values are expressed in 2015 billion EUR. The
dashed line describes the fraction that the sample represents as of total BIS debt securities. The sample
consists of an unbalanced panel of the European firms that were part of EURO STOXX Supersector Eu-
rozone indices, excluding financials and utilities. The bond debt comes from Capital IQ and BIS data are
downloaded from https://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm.
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Appendix B: Alternative Model
t = 0
Legacy
project
t = 1 t = 2
Disposable
cash flow y0
Choose liquidity
balance L
Intermediate
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New
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Can raise up to π˜ from
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(new issuance + debt renegotation)
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to shareholders
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PV E0 = PV A0 − PV D0
Figure IA.5 – Timeline
Setup: A firm has a legacy project (assets in place) that pays cash flows in each period,
as well as debt obligations that must be paid in each period. We model three dates ex-
plicitly: t=0, 1 and 2. Figure IA.5 illustrates the timeline. The last period t=2 summarizes
all future cash-flows. The existing assets in place generate a payoff stream for the firm
with present value PV E0 = PV A0 − PV D0, which is the difference between all future
cash-flows and debt service payments. We allow the structure of these payoff streams to
be arbitrary, and their duration (how their present value changes with discount rates) is
the only summary statistics needed for the analysis below. At t=0, the firm has disposable
cash-flow y0 as well as a new investment opportunity. This new project generates a stream
of cash-flows starting from t=2. An amount I invested at t=0 generates a present value of
R(I)PV I at t=2. Assume decreasing returns to scale, so that R is increasing and concave.
The term PV I summarizes the temporal structure of the cash-flows and captures the new
project duration, that plays an important role in the analysis.34
At t = 1, the firm faces some debt repayment of R1. As in the baseline model, how R1
varies with monetary policy depends on debt structure: the bank lending implies a large
34For example, if the project pays a first cash-flow R(I) that grows a rate g every period and the discount
rate is ρ, R(I)PV I = R(I)/(ρ− g).
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pass-through for loans relative to bonds. Following Holmström and Tirole (1998), we
model liquidity shocks as uncertain cash-flow at t=1: π1 can be unexpectedly low, without
any implication for terminal cash-flows. For simplicity, assume interim cash-flows can
take two values π1 ∈ {0, π}. In the bad state, the firm cannot afford its debt payment
and must then access extra funds to prevent financial distress. There are two sources of
extra funds. First, the firm can renegotiate down debt obligation R1 and lower them by
up to π˜ at t=1 (equivalently, raises up to π˜ from capital markets or draws down a credit
line). However, Holmström and Tirole (1998) show that this is unlikely to be enough to
withstand large enough shock because of two frictions: lack of pledgeability and debt
rigidity. The second friction is key to the effect of debt structure: as explained in the
main text, bonds are harder to renegotiate because they are held by dispersed creditors.
While it is often in the creditors’ best interest to renegotiate their claims or let themselves
be diluted by the issuance of new claims after a temporary shock, renegotiation frictions
create a "debt overhang" problem at the intermediate stage. In the model, that can be
formalized as a lower value of π˜ that can be raised at t=1 for firms with more bond debt.
The shortfall that cannot be covered by π˜ therefore has to be planned in advance,
and comes from the liquid assets L hoarded at t=0. In practice, liquid assets can come
in the form of cash, marketable securities like bonds, or access to credit lines granted
by banks. The firm thus face a "liquidity constraint" and must hold enough liquidity to
withstand the interim cash-flow shock, i.e., L + π˜ − R1 ≥ 0. (For simplicity, assume a
liquidity premium of zero). This liquidity constraints matters because we assume that
financial frictions limit the amount of liquid assets that can be purchased at t = 0. For
simplicity, assume the firm cannot raise new funds at t = 0 and thus disposable income
is allocated between new investment and liquid assets: y0 = I + L (alternatively, y0 could
be re-interpreted as debt capacity at t = 0).
Equilibrium Liquidity Demand and Investment: The firm jointly chooses I and L
in order to maximize expected profits subject to its liquidity constraint. Note first that it
is optimal for the firm to use all of its disposable income at t = 0 and thus L = y0 − I .
This allows to rewrite the maximization problem as a function of I only and the liquidity
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constraint:
max
I
PV E0 +R(I)PV I︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected terminal profits
+E[π1]−R1 + π˜ + y0 − I︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profits at t=1
s.t. π˜ + y0 − I −R1 ≥ 0
Denoting by λ the multiplier on the liquidity constraint, the FOC implies the following
optimality condition:
R′(I∗)PV I − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
net return of new project
= λ︸︷︷︸
shadow value of liquidity
Liquidity consideration distorts investment from its unconstrained optimum. Mathemat-
ically, the Lagrange multiplier captures the the shadow value of liquidity: the marginal value
of an extra dollar of disposable income at t = 0 or t = 1. If the constraint binds in equilib-
rium, investment is given by I∗ = π˜ + y0 −R1.
Stock Price Reaction to Monetary Policy: For simplicity, we assume an increase in
the policy rate rf has only two effects: (i) it reduces discount rates (duration effects), and
(ii) it raises debt burden, and in particular R1 at the intermediate stage. The stock price
reaction is given by the envelope theorem:
dEquity
drf
=
{
∂PV E0
∂rf
+R(I∗)
∂PV I
∂rf
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity duration
− λ︸︷︷︸
shadow value of liquidity
×
∂R1
∂rf︸︷︷︸
interest rate pass-through
(6)
The first term reflects the equity duration. The second term reveals how monetary policy
affects constraints—here, the liquidity constraint faced by the firm. It is the product of two
interpretable components. The interest rate pass-through captures how much rate hikes
increase debt burden at the intermediate stage. This tightens constraints because a rate
hike drains the cash-flow and makes it less likely that the firm withstands a temporary
shock, keeping its policy unchanged.35 The other term is the shadow value of the liquidity
constraint. Importantly, firms that face greater liquidity risk have a larger shadow value
35Note that incorporation a lqiudity premium would imply an additional term. Indeed, the cost of hold-
ing liquid assets can rise with the policy rate, as emphasized by recent work in monetary economics (Ro-
cheteau, Wright, and Zhang, 2018; Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl, 2018; Nagel, 2016). Numerous mecha-
nisms have been proposed, such as the change in the opportunity cost of near-money assets or the change
in supply of public money through open market operations. Moreover, in practice private money creation
by the financial sector is also important: many firms use credit lines granted by banks to insure against
future liquidity shocks or hold bank debt directly. A tightening of monetary policy can also reduce private
money creation, leading to a fall in the aggregate supply of liquid assets.
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of liquidity
The Role of Debt Structure: This decomposition makes it clear that debt structure
matters for stock market response but that the sign of the total effect is ambiguous. Fo-
cusing on the constraint effect, note first that the (multiform) bank lending channel im-
plies a lower interest rate pass-through for bonds relative to loans. This force predicts that
bond-financed firms are less responsive to monetary shock.
On the other hand, the existence of bond-specific frictions is a countervailing force.
The rigidity of bonds alters corporate liquidity management as it implies that a smaller
amount π˜ can be raised at t = 1 due to renegotiation frictions. If these bond frictions
are large enough, more bonds tighten the liquidity constraint faced by the firm every-
thing else equal, i.e., π˜ − R1 increases with the bond share. This implies a higher shadow
value of liquidity in equilibrium. This force predicts that bond-financed firms are more
responsive to monetary shock. In general, which effect dominates depends on details of
the environment and the relative magnitude of the different frictions.
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